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Abstract 
Following the development of a framework for critical stylistics (Jeffries 2010) and the 
explication of some of the theoretical assumptions behind this framework (Jeffries 2014a, 
2014b, 2015a, 2015b), the present article attempts to put this framework into a larger 
theoretical context as a way to approach textual meaning. Using examples from the popular 
U.S. television show, The Big Bang Theory, I examine the evidence that there is a kind of 
textual meaning which can be distinguished from the core propositional meaning on the one 
hand and from contextual, interpersonal meaning on the other. The specific aim, to 
demonstrate a layer of meaning belonging to text specifically, is set within an argument 
which claims that progress in linguistics can better be served by adherence to a  rigorous 
scientific discipline. 
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Introduction 
If we date it from the posthumous 
publication of Saussure’s ‘Cours de 
Linguistique’ in 1916, modern linguistics 
has not quite been around for a century. It is 
therefore still a young subject and it 
continues to expand its field of interest and 
develop its range of theories and methods in 
each generation. This is a success story 
which deserves appreciation. The reason 
that I am starting this article in such a 
general way is that I wish to propose that we 
pause and consider the basis of the great 
achievements of our discipline as the 
prelude to continued development and 
expansion. 
 
1. Background 
The basis of linguistics’ achievements, in my 
view, is its initial insistence on the science 
foundations that underpinned it. This has 
provided the systematicity and rigour that 
allowed early research into structural aspects 
of language to be evidenced, tested, 
contested and built upon to the point where 
we have a relatively strong description of 
many languages of the world, some of which 
has now become naturalised as an accurate 
account of how languages work. There is a 
great deal more to do, and there are periodic 
changes of emphasis. For example, there 
was a huge shift of emphasis between the 
text-oriented structuralist accounts of 
language (e.g. Saussure 1916) and the 
cognitive basis of Chomsky’s approach (e.g. 
Chomsky 1965), but I would argue that 
some things are now pretty much 
established truths. These include, for 
example, the fact that languages are multi-
layered structurally, meaning that we are 
producing/processing phonology, 
morphology, syntax and discourse levels of 
structure when we speak or listen. We are 
also doing other things, of course, but 
insights gained from these levels of 
linguistic investigation remain the common 
currency of much linguistics.  
As linguistics developed, it started looking 
outwards from the structural aspects of 
idealised languages, towards the variation 
amongst their speakers (sociolinguistics), 
the systematic nature of language use 
(pragmatics) and the cognitive 
underpinnings of language learning, 
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language production and language 
reception. Each of these departures from the 
initial narrow aim to describe the abstract 
code of human language has developed its 
own theories and methods and yet most of 
the time they have stayed close to the 
original aim – at least to be systematic and 
to focus on a manageable strand of 
linguistic activity/meaning. 
The one area of linguistic study which has 
not held on so tightly to this systematicity is 
the development of linguistics concerned 
with structures larger than the sentence. 
Whilst early discourse analysis (e.g. 
Coulthard 1992) was absolutely in the 
scientific tradition of linguistics and was 
empirical and evidence-based, my 
experience of some of what followed 
thereafter lacks the attention to rigour that 
is necessary for others to see how the 
researcher has reached his/her conclusions 
from the data investigated. This is partly 
because it was perceived, quite rightly, that 
human language is not primarily abstract 
and is highly affected by its context. The 
response to this fact was to move towards 
neighbouring disciplines such as sociology, 
politics and psychology to try to integrate 
the study of language into a wider 
framework of human interaction. 
The problem with this development was a 
logistical one. The more aspects of a 
phenomenon you try to study at once, the 
less you can be rigorous, systematic, 
empirical etc. There is simply too much to 
do. So, the result is that much work in these 
fields, interesting as it is, fails the basic test 
of all good science of being replicable. It is 
simply not possible in many cases to work 
out what data was investigated, how the 
examples given were chosen and whether 
the analysis was comprehensive, sampled in 
a principled way or simply impressionistic. 
To be fair, I think some of the scholars in 
this field would no longer claim that they 
were aiming at scientific rigour in the narrow 
sense, but I am unwilling to give up this 
quest, as it is the reason I studied linguistics 
in the first place. 
Jeffries (2000) set out a case for eclecticism 
in linguistics which rested on a strong 
conviction that we will not progress further 
in our understanding of human language if 
we persist in trying to develop holistic 
models of language that subsume every 
aspect of the communicative process in one 
framework. Far better, it seems to me, to 
identify separable strands of linguistic 
behaviour to look at in isolation before then 
considering how they tie in with other 
strands. This is the way that the hard 
sciences work and how they make progress; 
by working on manageable small problems 
which form part of the larger picture. Whilst 
some theoretical work may usefully develop 
comprehensive theories at the highest level 
of generalisation, these do not usually 
attempt to incorporate all the detail of every 
level of structure of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Instead, they provide an 
umbrella theory (with associated model) 
below which other models may form part of 
the whole picture. 
The argument I put forward in 2000 is not 
the weak claim that this is the only way our 
impoverished human minds can cope with 
the complexity of the data we are concerned 
with, whether that be particle physics or 
human language. Rather, I argued, 
theorising at all requires the production of 
testable hypotheses
1
 which are 
paradoxically, but inevitably, simpler than 
the data that they are investigating. Thus, 
for example, the practice of trying to control 
all variables except one, so that we can be 
certain of the findings being linked to that 
variable, is one way that scientific 
approaches try to shine a light on one aspect 
of a phenomenon at a time. This may be 
simplifying, but seems to me absolutely 
necessary for progress. A theory which 
produces models as or more complex than 
the data does not usually manage to explain 
much about how that data is structured or 
works. 
Another question for linguistics is the 
challenge from cognitivism, in particular the 
argument that descriptive models produced 
by theories of language tend to be intuitively 
unsatisfactory. This claim depends on the 
argument that models which separate out 
different strands of structure/meaning imply 
a range of concurrent processing by the 
brain which looks at first glance to be 
uneconomical of effort and potentially very 
costly in energy for the brain to cope with. 
This is a reasonable challenge, but one that I 
believe misses the point of scientific models. 
There is no claim that atoms in reality look 
just like the models that are used in 
chemistry textbooks to illustrate their make-
up. These are really metaphors for what 
atomic structure is like and as long as the 
                                                          
1
 Of course, cultural and literary studies have long used 
the term ‘theory’ to describe models of literary and 
cultural meaning which are entirely untestable, but I 
would say that this is a different meaning of the term 
and not one towards which linguistics ought to aspire. 
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model can be built upon to try out other 
ideas, then it is a useful one. Like over-
extended metaphors, models can become 
unwieldy when new discoveries are made 
and then a new one may be needed. But 
there is no claim that they are in any sense 
‘real’ and to argue against them on these 
grounds is a misunderstanding of what is 
going on. In addition, the argument from 
intuition is a weak one as human intuition is 
not a good guide to scientific reality as 
generations of scientists have discovered in 
disproving long-held assumptions such as 
the Earth being flat and the centrality of 
Earth in the heavens.  
If these principles of models as metaphors 
are accepted, the differences between, for 
example, Gricean scholars (see K. Petrus, ed. 
2010) and Relevance theorists (e.g. Sperber 
and Wilson 2004) about whether there is too 
much cognitive processing implied by one 
model or another, may have missed the 
point. It seems to me that a Gricean model 
does not have to insist that we process 
literal and implied meaning separately any 
more than general linguistics assumes that 
we process phonology separately from 
morphology, syntax or semantics. The reality 
is integrated. But if we try to produce an 
integrated model of such complex data, no 
systematic or testable insights will be 
generated and the model will be unable to 
explain anything about the data. Here are 
Sperber and Wilson making the case against 
Gricean pragmatics on precisely these 
grounds:  
 
a. Peter: What do you think of Martin’s latest 
novel?  
b. Mary: It puts me to sleep.  
 
In Grice’s framework, Mary’s utterance in 
should have three distinct interpretations: as 
a literal assertion, a hyperbole or a 
metaphor. Of these, Peter should test the 
literal interpretation first, and move to a 
figurative interpretation only if the literal 
interpretation blatantly violates the maxim 
of truthfulness. Yet there is now a lot of 
experimental evidence suggesting that literal 
interpretations do not have to be tested and 
rejected before figurative interpretations are 
considered; indeed, in interpreting (13b), it 
would probably not even occur to Peter to 
wonder whether Mary literally fell asleep. 
(Sperber and Wilson , 2004 p.268) 
I am not theorising here about cognitive 
processing of utterances, but the same 
points seem to me to be relevant, whether 
one is concerned with core linguistic 
meaning (phonology, morphology, syntax 
and semantics) or with situated utterance 
comprehension. Rigour in explanation is 
what helps us to move forward in 
understanding this most complex of human 
behaviours and this depends more often 
than not on separating out strands for 
detailed examination.  Once the individual 
strands are well described, there can also be 
models produced which examine the 
interfaces between these strands. These can 
also be rigorously tested of course once 
precise hypotheses have been produced. 
 
2. What we know about texts 
Before I describe what I mean by textual 
meaning, let us consider what a language 
user knows about texts. I will begin this 
section with the most general question of 
what human language encompasses, so that 
textual meaning can be fitted into that larger 
picture. Whilst there are clearly some links 
between language and other forms of 
communication (body language, visual 
imagery, artistic expression through, e.g., 
music or dance), this is one case where my 
points (above) about clarity of purpose and 
ability to make progress are relevant. Whilst 
there are people working effectively on all of 
these aspects, and others, there remain 
unanswered questions about the core 
aspects of linguistic communication which 
still merit investigation. 
I have written elsewhere about this (Jeffries 
2014a/b and 2015 a/b), but I would like to 
reiterate my conviction that it is useful to 
identify at least three general aspects of 
human (linguistic) communication which 
language users are drawing on as producers 
and responding to as recipients. These, I 
would suggest, can helpfully be studied 
separately, and often are in practice. Despite 
the best efforts of some scholars to 
integrate them into a single layered model, 
many researchers in linguistics continue to 
find it most productive to delve into their 
own specialist field, for understandable 
reasons of scope and expertise. Other 
researchers have travelled in the opposite 
direction, attempting to encompass all 
aspects of a communicative act into their 
descriptions and theorising (e.g. Harris 
1999; Toolan 1996). The results of this latter 
process are varied, but they can result in the 
almost unwitting setting aside of some of 
the most basic knowledge about linguistic 
structure and meaning. This may be based 
on the wholly defensible idea that it is 
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impossible to describe everything at once, 
but the point is not normally made explicitly 
and the consequence is not always a 
focussed, rigorous study of a well-defined 
phenomenon. The danger of claiming such 
comprehensiveness, whilst risking the 
eclipsing of decades of progress in linguistic 
description, is that some of the earliest 
mistakes in understanding how language 
works may be replicated as a result.  
Some of the work coming from CDA (Critical 
Discourse Analysis) reflects this concern 
about losing insights from linguistics. 
Though there are no doubt many insights of 
value in the work, I find the so-called 
‘methods’ are often lacking in the kind of 
detail that would enable me to see how their 
conclusions are reached. Here is a fairly 
typical account of what CDA is supposed to 
be about: 
Critical discourse analysis, (...) oscillates 
between a focus on structure and a focus on 
action – between a focus on shifts in the 
social structuring of semiotic diversity 
(orders of discourse), and a focus on the 
productive semiotic work which goes on in 
particular texts and interactions. In both 
perspectives, a central concern is shifting 
articulations between genres, discourses and 
styles – the shifting social structuring of 
relationships between them which achieve a 
relative stability and permanence in orders 
of discourse, and the ongoing working of 
relationships between them in texts and 
interactions. (Fairclough 2001:124) 
Whilst some of the new ‘theories’ that are 
used in those fields produce interesting 
observations, these can be at the expense of 
other more testable insights with longevity 
from linguistic science. I do not want to 
critique such ideas in detail here, for reasons 
of space, but they share the main fault, in 
my view, of not making clear how their 
categories and labels can be linked to the 
text in any consistent or transparent way. 
The danger of this development links to 
similar developments in literary studies: The 
analyst may end up using his or her intuitive 
understanding of the text being investigated 
and simply assert that this or that ‘feature’ 
associated with the theory is present. Such a 
lack of textual evidencing of supposed 
theoretical constructs produces descriptions 
of data (texts) which tacitly assume that 
textual meaning is transparent and anyone 
with the right skills can decode it. Of course, 
this is precisely what discourse analysts (and 
literary scholars) would claim not to be 
doing, but the reality is that unless the 
source of labels being attached to textual 
features can be clearly identified as 
evidence, and questioned by other 
researchers, the analysis is in danger of 
being performed as a kind of ‘tour de force’ 
rather than being offered as a potential, 
testable and therefore mutable description 
of the language being used. 
Michael Halliday (see Halliday and 
Mattheissen 2004) is one of those who has 
attempted to build a single unified model 
and his Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) 
in some ways could be seen as an example 
of a framework trying to do too many things 
at once. Despite these misgivings, one of the 
most useful contributions from his work, in 
my opinion, is the three-way metafunction 
distinction he makes between textual, 
ideational and interpersonal meaning. I 
would like to build on his distinction to 
elaborate where I see the place of textual 
meaning to be in a general model of human 
language. Rather than seeing the 
metafunctions as linked to linguistic forms 
and systems themselves, however, I would 
see them more closely linked to the level of 
abstraction of the linguistic features 
concerned. Thus, instead of conceiving of 
two semantico-syntactic systems, such as 
transitivity and modality, as being formally 
at the same level but meta-functioning in 
different ways (ideationally and 
interpersonally respectively), I propose 
instead that systems at the same level 
operate in the same meta-functional way. 
Thus, noun phrase/group and verb 
phrase/group structures both form part of 
the linguistic underpinning to the language 
(Halliday’s textual metafunction), whilst 
transitivity and modality operate at a textual 
level, producing ideation, and systems like 
speech acts or Gricean maxims operate at 
the interpersonal level. 
What Halliday calls the textual metafunction, 
I wish to rename ‘linguistic’ meaning 
(covering forms and functions). This is the 
abstract and de-contextual centre of 
linguistic structure and meaning, and 
includes the kind of topics you find in the 
core linguistics modules on any 
undergraduate course: Phonetics, 
Phonology, Morphology, Syntax, Semantics. 
These are, of course, idealised abstractions 
from actual language use, and there are 
compromises made by such descriptions, 
with the variation on geographical, gender, 
social and other grounds often neutralised 
or backgrounded in the resulting 
descriptions. However, this is not the ‘ideal 
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speaker-hearer’ of Chomsky’s imagination 
(1965), since the same kind of (rigorous) 
linguistic descriptions of these variations can 
also be made, as we see from the large body 
of work in sociolinguistics. 
What Halliday calls the ideational 
metafunction equates to what I call textual 
meaning. His framework links ideation 
particularly to transitivity and this is a 
central component of textual meaning in my 
model too, drawing on his and others’ work 
in this field. Textual meaning is the co-
textual effect of how the structures 
produced by the underlying linguistic 
systems work. This level of description 
answers the question of what the text is 
doing in creating an ideational ‘world’. We 
will see some examples below which will 
make this intermediate level of meaning 
clearer. The final type of meaning is the fully 
contextual, or interpersonal, meaning. For 
me, this encompasses pragmatics and 
answers the question of what the language 
is doing to/with the people in the situation, 
rather than how it is helping recipients to 
create a mental image of the world it 
describes. 
So, let us come back to the question that I 
raised at the beginning of this section: What 
do language users know about texts? Well of 
course a competent language user will know 
about the sounds, morphemic structure, 
syntax and semantics of his/her language. 
This may be a standard language or a 
dialect, but there will be some core 
information that the user knows. S/he will 
also know about how texts work to create 
meaning over and above the semantic. This 
is the level that I call textual meaning and it 
is the one that I think stylistics in its 
broadest sense is concerned with. Then s/he 
will know about how the text is being used 
in a situational context and will use 
pragmatic knowledge to understand what is 
being done with the language that has been 
used. 
These different levels of meaning – 
linguistic, textual (ideational) and 
interpersonal – all run concurrently, just like 
the lower levels within each of these meta-
levels. So, we are processing phonology, 
morphology and syntax at the same time, 
without this apparently indicating that it 
takes three times the effort or three times 
the length of time. Similarly with the three 
meta-levels. We are processing linguistic, 
textual and interpersonal meaning at the 
same time, but this does not in itself amount 
to a claim about the amount of cognitive 
activity we are performing, just a way to 
separate out the different aspects of what 
may in fact be chemically or biologically a 
single action. 
 
3. A theory of textual meaning 
I would be critical of those who use the word 
‘theory’ too loosely without providing any 
testable hypotheses arising from the 
putative theory, and I am therefore also wary 
of suggesting that what I am proposing is a 
theory. Nevertheless, I wish to suggest that 
whatever the overall theory of human 
language looks like, text should have a place 
at the centre of linguistics and this requires 
some theoretical projections. I have also 
been forthright about the need for rigour in 
linguistic description, so I will try to make 
clear below how the illustrations of textual 
meaning link to the text, and how they can 
be separated from linguistic and from 
interpersonal meaning, to demonstrate their 
viability as descriptive apparatus. 
What I propose to do in the remainder of this 
article is to use the ‘textual conceptual 
functions’ (TCFs) from my critical stylistics 
framework (Jeffries 2010b) as the basis of an 
account of textual meaning. I have 
illustrated them copiously in relation to 
ideology in that book, so here I will choose a 
range of ideational meaning, not all of it 
necessarily ideologically loaded. Before 
embarking on this task, however, I would 
like to comment on the status of this 
descriptive framework in relation to the 
question of whose meaning we are 
discussing. There are logically at least three 
loci of meaning that we might be interested 
in. There is the meaning of the producer, the 
meaning of the text and the meaning of the 
recipient. There may, of course, also be 
others who have different perspectives such 
as Goffman’s (1981) eavesdroppers and 
overhearers or anachronistic readers of 
historical texts and there is certainly the 
possibility that readers/recipients may have 
more than one interpretation (Jeffries 2001) 
of a text on different occasions, or even 
simultaneously. But these depend on all the 
personal, historical and contextual features 
that many other scholars are working on and 
I wish to focus on the textual meaning as a 
separate strand. I will argue that there is a 
useful sense in which we can talk about 
textual meaning and that the proof of this 
being separable, if not always separate in 
fact from producer and recipient meaning, is 
that the textual meaning may not be 
immediately accessible to the producer or 
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recipient and is often, therefore, at a sub-
conscious level for the participants 
themselves.  
I hope that the discussion of some examples 
below will demonstrate that with the help of 
a framework of this kind, it is possible to 
describe fairly consistently what is going on 
textually which is dependent on, but 
different from, what is going on linguistically 
and informs, but does not determine, what 
is going on interpersonally – or 
interpretatively.  
 
4. Textual-conceptual functions 
I do not propose to explain the TCFs in any 
detail here as there are now a number of 
published accounts of them available (see, 
for example, Jeffries 2010b, 2014b). For the 
same reason, I will not, this time, take each 
of them in turn and try to isolate the specific 
meaning attaching just to that TCF. There 
are many such examples in other 
publications. Instead, I will examine a small 
number of examples in detail, explaining the 
relevant TCFs and how they work together to 
produce textual meaning. At the same time, 
I will attempt to make clear the relationship 
between the textual meaning, the linguistic 
meaning and any interpersonal (or 
interpretative) meaning that is evident in the 
context.  
 
4.1 Naming, negation and opposition 
Naming is ubiquitous in texts. There is a 
sense in which texts are largely divided 
between what is named (things, people, 
abstractions) and what processes they are 
involved in (events, actions etc.). In the 
following example, the more intermittent 
occurrence of the TCFs of constructed 
opposition  and negation (Nahajec 2009) is 
paired with naming to create an 
interpersonal moment in the lives of 
characters in a well-known sit-com (The Big 
Bang Theory)
2
:  
Penny gives Sheldon a Christmas gift. 
Sheldon: “No, Penny! I know you think you’re 
being generous but the foundation of gift 
giving is reciprocity. You haven’t given me a 
gift, you’ve given me an obligation.”  
                                                          
2
 I have chosen all my examples from this TV series (The 
Big Bang Theory), to illustrate that TCFs and textual 
meaning as a whole works in texts that are very 
different from those I have used elsewhere in 
illustrating, for example, political meaning. Most of the 
examples used here can be found very easily by 
searching online. 
 
Here, the statement “You haven’t given me a 
gift, you’ve given me an obligation.” can be 
understood linguistically as a pair of clauses 
in a complex sentence, with parallel 
structures consisting of Subject, Predicator, 
Indirect Object, Direct Object in each case. In 
addition, the first clause is negated by the 
addition of the particle ‘not’ to the auxiliary 
verb have and except for the direct objects, 
the lexical items are identical (you, have, 
given, me). The direct objects are both noun 
phrases with indefinite articles and a head 
noun in each case. The semantics of the 
clauses are likewise parallel, apart from the 
negation of the first clause and refer to two 
people, identified by the first and second 
pronouns (you, me) and a transaction 
between these people which is referred to by 
the di-transitive verb give.  
In textual terms, the negation of the first 
clause and the foregrounded differences 
between the two direct objects as a result of 
the parallelism work together to set up the 
expectation that their referents will be in a 
relationship of opposition. This creates a 
world view which the audience will ascribe to 
Sheldon in which a gift is a good thing with 
no consequences for the recipient, whereas 
an obligation is full of consequences. In 
Sheldon’s world, the two are incompatible, 
so if gift-giving produces an obligation to 
reciprocate, then this very fact creates a 
paradox whereby the gift can no longer, in 
fact, be a gift. For Penny, Sheldon’s 
interlocutor in this scene, this produces 
offence as she does not see the obligation 
that Sheldon claims is the result of her 
action. The interpersonal aspect of this 
utterance, then, would be described by 
pragmaticians by reference to the offence 
caused, innocently, by Sheldon because of 
his system of values which clashes with the 
socially prevailing one, where he should 
thank Penny and keep quiet about any 
obligation that he may see as following from 
her act.  
The table below may help to summarise 
these separate strands of meaning: 
 
Utterance → 
 
Meaning type 
↓ 
You haven’t given me a gift, 
you’ve given me an 
obligation 
Linguistic P has not given S something 
(a gift), P has given S 
something (an obligation) 
Textual 
(ideational) 
S sees gifts and obligations 
as theoretically oppositional 
(and paradoxically linked). 
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Interpersonal S is explicitly offended by 
the obligation he perceives 
as following from the gift-
giving and P is likely to be 
offended by S’s lack of 
‘normal’ response to gift-
giving. The latter is 
confirmed by her response 
as she tries to take back the 
gift. 
 
Note that the claim I am making about 
textual meaning is that there is likely to be 
agreement between Sheldon and Penny 
about the ideational meaning attached to his 
statement. Thus, without agreeing with him, 
Penny is obliged to accept that he sees the 
world differently to her (and by implication 
to the rest of society) in that he makes 
explicit a consequence of gift-giving (i.e. 
obligation) that others prefer to leave 
unstated, even if they sometimes feel the 
same way.  The audience, who might be 
seen as similar in nature to Goffman’s 
(1981) overhearers, may be amused by the 
mismatch in A and B’s understanding of the 
transaction and The Big Bang Theory 
depends for its humour on many such 
mismatches of ideation. 
 
4.2 Transitivity, Prioritising, Negation, 
Modality and Enumerating 
Like naming, transitivity is also ubiquitous as 
it refers to the choice of verb in each clause. 
This is not simply a question of semantics, 
but of the kinds of process that the text 
presents. In the following example, the 
transitivity choices, combined with negation 
and listing, create an ideational scenario in 
which high value is placed on not being 
pestered verbally and on a quality 
(zazziness) that appears to be invented: 
Sheldon is suddenly obsessed by cats and 
brings a large number of them into the 
apartment. “Cats make wonderful 
companions. They don’t argue or question 
my intellectual authority and this little guy 
here, I think you’ll find to be quite zazzy.”  
The linguistic analysis of the final sentence 
above would describe three clauses, two of 
which have ‘cats’ as their grammatical 
subject and are coordinated (using or) with 
an implied (elided) subject in the second. 
These two subjects are followed by a 
negated intransitive verb (don’t argue) and 
an (implicitly negated) transitive verb 
(question) respectively, the second followed 
by an object noun phrase (my intellectual 
authority). The third clause changes 
structure as it has a fronted grammatical 
object (this little guy here), the speaker (I) as 
subject with the verb think followed by two 
further subordinate clauses with second 
person (you) as subject of find and the cats 
(again subject to ellipsis) as subject of be. 
The final clause element of the most 
subordinate clause is an adjectival 
complement which appears to be an 
invented word: zazzy. 
The textual analysis of this same sentence 
would be based on the propositions arising 
from the linguistic analysis, but would focus 
on what kind of ideation is being produced. 
So, what we have is a three-part ‘list’ of 
clauses, implying that Sheldon (as usual) has 
the last word on the topic under discussion 
because three-part lists are conceptualised 
as complete. However, the three clauses are 
not parallel in structure or complexity. The 
first two are typical of Sheldon’s categorical 
style (i.e. they are unmodalised and 
therefore more quietly certain than a modal 
version would be). This assured – sometimes 
even arrogant – style is typical of Sheldon’s 
character, but the final clause is entirely 
unlike him, which is part of why the scene is 
amusing to the audience. This clause is 
modalised (I think; you’ll find) to show that 
Sheldon is more vulnerable and uncertain 
than he normally seems. This clause is also 
structured in a complex way, as we saw in 
the linguistic description, with two layers of 
subordination below the main clause (I think) 
so that the assertion of the cat’s zazziness 
ends up being at the third level of 
subordination. Not only does Sheldon show 
his vulnerability by using modality, then, but 
he also puts his assertion (the cat is zazzy) 
at a very low, and therefore relatively 
unimportant, level of structure. The 
intermediate clause (you’ll find) is not only 
modal (being related to future time) but it is 
also a sign that Sheldon, who is not normally 
a good communicator, is willing to share the 
experience of the cat with his interlocutors. 
In addition to the change in structure, the 
first two sentences use negation to conjure 
up an alternative ‘world’ in which cats – or 
some others - DO argue and question his 
authority, which like many negated 
propositions, produces the notion that such 
verbalisations as arguing and questioning 
are expected as the norm for his life. The 
implicature (interpersonally) is that the 
human beings around Sheldon are a 
nuisance in just this way. The third sentence 
changes structure, polarity (it is positive) 
and also transitivity. The meaningful verb (at 
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the bottom of all the layers of structure) is to 
be and it brings Sheldon’s sentence to a 
more restful conclusion, as he describes the 
quality of this cat using the relational 
intensive copula. 
The interpersonal side of this sentence has 
already been hinted at. Sheldon is indirectly 
criticising his best friend and his mother for 
actively interfering in his life. He wants 
companionship without challenge and the 
cats – particularly the zazzy one – provide 
just such society.  
 
Utterance → 
 
Meaning type 
↓ 
They don’t argue or 
question my intellectual 
authority and this little guy 
here, I think you’ll find to be 
quite zazzy 
Linguistic S asserts that cats don’t 
argue or question his 
intellectual authority and 
that one in particular has 
the quality of being ‘zazzy’ 
Textual 
(ideational) 
S uses negation to imply 
that others (people? specific 
people?) DO argue and 
question his intellectual 
authority. He uses a three-
part list to create the 
impression that this is all 
that needs to be said on the 
matter of cats. The 
transitivity choices show 
that verbalisation is not 
valued highly whereas 
having a (positive) quality 
(Intensive Relational) is 
naturalised as being of high 
value. The complex 
structure of the third 
sentence is also doubly 
modalised at the two higher 
levels and this indicates a 
more self-doubting and less 
arrogant side of Sheldon, 
which is rarely seen. It also 
connects him to the others 
as he indicates that he 
expects they will find the 
cat just as zazzy as he does. 
Interpersonal S is talking in the presence 
of his mother (M) and his 
housemate (L), both of 
whom are implicated as 
people who argue and 
question his authority and 
are thereby criticised. So 
there is scope for offence 
here. 
The audience (overhearers?) is likely to find 
the juxtaposition of the first two items in the 
list with the final item, funny. This is partly 
on the basis of their prior knowledge of the 
character, Sheldon, who is much more likely 
to make the first two points than to show his 
own vulnerability and affection for a creature 
as he does in the final item. 
 
4.3 Discourse presentation, negation, 
opposition neutralisation 
The following extract takes place in a 
restaurant between Sheldon and his 
girlfriend, Amy. He is under pressure to be 
more actively romantic, which does not fit 
with his rational, scientific character. But this 
time he appears to have chosen the right 
words: 
 Sheldon: “Amy. When I look in your eyes and 
you’re looking back in mine, everything feels 
not quite normal. Because I feel stronger and 
weaker at the same time. I feel excited and 
at the same time, terrified. The truth is, I 
don’t know what I feel except I know what 
kind of man I want to be.”  
Sheldon is here apparently addressing Amy 
directly. We could analyse the structures and 
semantics of the speech here, but let us 
focus instead on the textual meaning. 
Sheldon creates a world in which 
conventional mutually exclusive opposites 
such as strength and weakness can co-exist. 
Similarly with excitement and fear (terrified). 
He also uses negation (not quite normal and 
I don’t know what I feel) which conjures up 
the expectation of feeling normal and 
knowing how one feels. So, in every way, 
Sheldon is telling Amy that when he looks in 
her eyes the world changes fundamentally. 
This is a common trope used by lovers to 
show how much power the beloved has; to 
alter the basis of the world. 
The regular viewer of this show will be 
surprised (and pleased for Amy) on hearing 
Sheldon apparently coming out with such a 
heartfelt declaration of love. But both 
audience and girlfriend are let down by what 
follows: 
 
Amy: “Sheldon, that was beautiful.”  
Sheldon: “I should hope so, that’s from the 
first Spiderman movie.” 
 
The joke, in this case, is that Sheldon’s only 
way of rising to the challenge of being a 
suitably romantic boyfriend is to plagiarise 
from a film and then immediately admit to 
having done so. The interpersonal aspects of 
this sequence of utterances, then, are the 
Brought to you by | Slovak Academy of Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/7/16 4:35 PM
Topics in Linguistics - Issue 15 – June 2015 
 
 
 
raising of expectations on Amy’s part, 
followed by the dashing of her fantasies 
when he admits they are not his own words. 
The conventions of speech presentation 
include the idea that being faithful to the 
original words is important, but only when 
they are also credited to the original 
speaker. Sheldon does both, but in the 
wrong order, so that for a moment, the 
audience and Amy are transported to a 
hypothetical world in which he is capable of 
poetic love declarations. 
 
Conclusion: Stylistics at the core 
The previous section attempted to spell out 
very specific aspects of meaning that are 
inherent in the texts that I was describing. 
These aspects of ideation, I would argue, are 
likely to be commonly accepted (though 
often subconsciously) as being part of the 
meaning of the text, whatever the personal 
viewpoints or ideologies of the participants. 
This is one of the reasons why advertising, 
propaganda and persuasive language have 
some chance of winning the recipient(s) 
over. There is a sense in which the 
reader/hearer of a piece of language has no 
choice but to temporarily suspend their own 
viewpoints and assumptions and to enter the 
world of the text. They may or may not 
recognise the ideation (and ideology) 
consciously and they may or may not agree 
or contest the version of the world that the 
text contains, but for the purposes of 
processing language, they have to accept the 
world construction as it is given in the text. 
The TCFs that form part of critical stylistics 
as a framework are an attempt to bring 
together those concepts which have a 
relatively stable set of realisations and which 
produce a particular structuring dimension 
for the text world. This includes what kinds 
of things are negated, hypothesised or 
opposed, who/what are the actors and 
who/what the goals of processes; what kinds 
of assumptions and implications are being 
made; which propositions are main (i.e. high 
in the structure) and which are either less 
important or more taken for granted (i.e. 
lower in the structure) and so on. 
The examples used here to illustrate this 
approach were chosen from a set of 
potential extracts on the basis that they each 
illustrated a range of TCFs working together 
and across the set, most of the TCFs were 
represented at some point. The development 
of a theoretical approach of this kind 
depends on repeated testing of the ideas 
being developed and any counterexamples 
which show that the ideas don’t work will 
contribute to the refinement – or even 
possibly the abandonment of the theory and 
its associated framework. What I have tried 
to demonstrate through the analyses above 
is the simple idea that what I am calling 
textual meaning is demonstrably distinct 
from linguistic meaning on the one hand (i.e. 
the basic semantic-syntactic meaning) and 
from interpersonal meaning on the other 
hand (i.e. what pragmatics would have to say 
about the context and resulting personalised 
meaning). The rigour invoked here is that of 
deductive reasoning, not inductive 
processes. The latter would require the 
collection and description of a well-defined 
set of data, in order to establish what that 
data set contained and to test the framework 
that is being used. This would be a very 
sensible next step in the testing of the ideas 
I have expounded here. At the moment, I am 
trying out these ideas on a range of different 
text types to see how far the concept of 
textual meaning can be applied and whether 
any texts arise that challenge its very basis.  
To sum up, my work in this field is the 
culmination of a thought process which 
started when I began to call myself a 
stylistician. I was working with text, but that 
very activity was marginalised and not seen 
as central to linguistic endeavours. There 
was a sense in which ‘literary stylistics’ was 
seen as neither linguistics nor literary 
studies and as a result it belonged on the 
margins of both and was central to neither.  
Likewise, non-literary stylistics has not been 
incorporated readily into discourse analysis 
and critical discourse analysis. Attempting to 
make space amongst all the descriptive 
frameworks of linguistics for a specifically 
textual level of meaning, which ascribes 
characteristics to the world it describes, has 
been my aim, whether that world is fictional, 
historical, real or hypothetical. There is 
much still to do on this topic, but I think it 
will reward further study.  
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